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THE NONSUPREME COURT 
Kathleen M. Sullivan* 
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT. By Robert A. Burt. Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. 462. 
$29.95. 
I 
The conventional wisdom on what liberals think about the Warren 
Court goes something like this: In the beginning there was the Warren 
Court and it was good. It desegregated the schools, reapportioned the 
legislatures, civilized the station house, unshackled the speech of dissi-
dents, and stayed the hand of government in matters of reproductive 
choice. It called this constitutional interpretation. Then came the 
critics who called it legislation from the bench. The critics won the 
elections. They made all the appointments to the Court for a quarter 
of a century. The Warren Court was no more. And liberals retreated 
to the wilderness, celebrating the fading memory of the Warren Court 
and waiting for its time to come again. 
Like any conventional wisdom, this one has partial truth. But it 
also overlooks entirely one of the most striking recent trends in consti-
tutional scholarship. As conservatives attacked from without the no-
tion of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation that is 
traditionally associated with the Warren Court, an array of liberal and 
progressive constitutional scholars lobbed their own critiques of this 
notion from within. Robert Burt's The Constitution in Conflict is the 
latest entry in this literature of progressive self-criticism.1 Burt's cen-
tral thesis is that judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation 
violates a fundamental norm of equality that should govern social and 
political relations. In his view, the Court heeds this norm when it 
serves as a participant in constitutional dialogue rather than an oracle 
of constitutional truth. In short, conventional liberal worship of the 
Warren Court gets it wrong. 
This thesis situates Burt squarely in what might be called the Prot-
estant rather than the Catholic wing of liberal thought on how consti-
tutional interpretation ought to be structured. I borrow this analogy, 
of course, from the evocative work of Sanford Levinson2 and Thomas 
• Professor of Law, Harvard. B.A. 1976, Cornell; B.A. 1978, Oxford; J.D. 1981, Harvard. 
- Ed. The author thanks Tom Grey and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments. 
1. Robert Burt is the Southmayd Professor of Law at the Yale Law School. 
2. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). 
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Grey.3 For present purposes, the key aspect of this analogy is not the 
difference in approaches to text - Protestants look to text alone while 
Catholics look to both text and unwritten tradition4 - but the differ-
ence in approaches to institutional interpretive authority - Catholics 
centralize interpretive authority in the Pope (Supreme Court) while 
Protestants decentralize or deinstitutionalize that authority.5 Justice 
Jackson once said, in a kind of constitutional Catholic in-joke, that the 
Court is not final because infallible, but infallible because final. 6 Con-
stitutional Protestants see the Court as neither infallible, final, or a 
Pope. As the Protestant-leaning Levinson recently put it, those who 
would bring about a constitutional Reformation must start with the 
"'defetishization'" of the Court.7 
How might one go about defetishizing the Court? First, one might 
devolve greater authority to interpret the Constitution upon the nonju-
dicial branches of government. On this view, the Court's interpreta-
tion is not hierarchically superior but competes on an equal footing 
with that of other branches. Supreme Court rulings bind the parties in 
a particular case, but they need not command executive or legislative 
acquiescence in the next one. President Reagan's Attorney General 
Edwin Meese took a lot of heat for asserting this view in a notorious 
1986 speech.8 But constitutional Protestants thought he had a point.9 
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, after all, had each ap-
proved defiance of Supreme Court decisions they deemed profoundly 
3. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). In 
borrowing the terms "Catholic" and "Protestant," I mean no interdenominational offense. As 
Levinson and Grey pointed out in launching these terms into constitutional theory discourse, 
Judaism and Islam also split along lines of textual and institutional difference parallel to those 
dividing Christians. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 19-27. 
Burt does not employ the terms "Catholic" and "Protestant" explicitly in his book. But, 
elsewhere in his work, he has invoked comparisons between constitutionalism and religion that 
suggest he might not entirely resist the metaphor here. See Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law 
and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 466-78 (1984); Robert A. Burt, Precedent 
and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1690-93 (1991). 
Moreover, some evidence that the "Protestant" label may be appropriate comes from the fact 
that Sanford Levinson, an erstwhile constitutional Protestant himself, furnished an enthusiastic 
cover blurb for The Constitution in Conflict, praising Burt's "well-thought-out attack on the stan-
dard notion of judicial supremacy" and approving Burt's argument that the Constitution is "a 
communally interpreted document, in which the Court plays an important but not predominant 
role" (book jacket). 
4. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 18-23, 30-37; Grey, supra note 3, at 3, 5-9. 
5. LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 23-30. 
6. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
7. Sanford Levinson, Tiers of Scrutiny - From Strict Through Rational Bases - and the 
Future of Interests: Commentary on Fiss and Linde, 55 ALBANY L. REV. 745, 747 (1992) (attrib-
uting this term to Frank Michelman). 
8. Edwin Meese, The Law Of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); see LEVINSON, 
supra note 2, at 39-46. 
9. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 39-46; see also Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right 
This Time?, 293 THE NATION 689, 704; Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of 
the Land, ar.d Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TuL. L. REV. 1017 (1987). 
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wrong.10 Of course, people disagree about when such defiance is ap-
propriate and, if so, what form it should take. 11 But constitutional 
Protestants do not presume interbranch interpretive controversy to be 
unhealthy. 
Second, and more radically, one might devolve greater authority to 
interpret the Constitution upon the citizenry at large. This approach 
reduces the importance of all institutional intermediaries in favor of 
popular mobilization and engagement. Individual citizens may con-
front the Constitution directly, like individual sinners contemplating 
their God without priests. For example, Robin West has argued that 
constitutional adjudication is inherently "authoritarian," "conserva-
tive," "hierarchic," "elitist" and "nonparticipatory"12 - and there-
fore that constitutional discourse ought to be reclaimed by the 
citizenry acting in more participatory modes. 
Those who sound such themes do not always agree on the citi-
zenry's capacity for sustained constitutional engagement. Civic repub-
lican revivalists such as Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman have 
sometimes seemed to assq.me that deliberative engagement by the citi-
zenry can be more or less continuous.13 Bruce Ackerman, in contrast, 
has suggested that citizens' energy for heightened deliberation on mat-
ters of constitutional import is limited, and he has therefore offered a 
"dualist" account in which "constitutional moments" of "higher law-
making" alternate with the default program of "normal politics."14 
Despite these differences in detail, these scholars in common seek to 
relativize the conventional liberal distinction between politics and con-
stitutional lawmaking. For them, rights are not trumps but just cards 
in the deck. In the words of Ronald Collins and David Skover, such 
approaches tend "to reunite constitutionalism with democracy."15 Or, 
in Robin West's words, they seek to repose constitutional authority in 
"'We the People' rather than 'They the Court.' " 16 
These techniques for unseating the Court from its papal throne in 
10. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 38-42; GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CON!>'TITUTIONAL 
LAW 50-54 (2d ed. 1991). Jefferson's, Jackson's, Lincoln's, and Roosevelt's disagreements with 
the Court centered, respectively, on the constitutionality of sedition laws, the Bank of the United 
States, slavery, and laws altering the balance of power between labor and capital. 
11. For example, declining to enforce a statute the Court has upheld may be less problematic 
than prosecuting under a law the Court has struck down. Cf Laurence G. Sager, Fair Measure: 
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978). 
12. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 714-
15 (1990). 
13. See Frank Michelman, The Supreme Coun, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
14. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991). 
15. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 189, 235 (1988). 
16. Robin West, The Supreme Coun, 1989 Term - Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 106 (1990). 
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constitutional interpretation leave open the question of what, exactly, 
a nonsupreme Supreme Court is supposed to do. Robert Burt's Con-
stitution in Conflict is an extended meditation on this question. Burt 
elaborates the institutional psychodynamic of Protestant constitution-
alism: how the Court might internalize a communal rather than a 
hierarchical role. 
II 
Burt himself does not use the terms Catholic and Protestant to 
distinguish the ideal of judicial supremacy from the ideal of egalitarian 
judicial participation in constitutional dialogue. He organizes the dis-
tinction instead around archetypes he derives from American constitu-
tional history, with Hamilton on one side and Madison and Lincoln on 
the other. Most of the book is devoted to a detailed historical account 
of the dialectic between these two archetypes. But the thrust of the 
book is unmistakably normative: Burt argues that the Madison-Lin-
coln approach is the better one. 
The judicial supremacist vision of the Court that Burt deplores has 
prevailed ever since Hamilton in Federalist 78 first located the 
Supreme Court atop a "hierarchical pyramid" within the national gov-
emment.17 In Burt's view, paradigmatic examples of the Supreme 
Court's wrongheaded Hamiltonian decisionmaking include McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 18 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 19 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 20 Loch-
ner v. New York, 21 and Roe v. Wade. 22 
What error did these various decisions have in common? Not any 
substantive error in constitutional interpretation but rather the institu-
tional error of judicial arrogance. In each, the Court deemed itself the 
"hierarchically supreme, definitive interpreter[] of the Constitution" 
(p. 254). All of these decisions embodied "efforts to interpose judicial 
authority in order to suppress direct conflictual interaction among the 
contending parties" (p. 247). In each, the Court "fashioned a preemp-
tive weapon" meant to silence dialogue between the opposing sides (p. 
349). The result, as Burt characterizes it, was judicially coerced subju-
gation of one side to the other: "national government [triumphed] over 
the states in McCulloch, the southern slaveowners [over the slaves] in 
Prigg and Dred Scott, and the propertied few [over the laboring many] 
17. P. 53 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
18. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding congressional authority to charter a national 
bank and invalidating a state effort to tax it); see pp. 132-43. 
19. 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 539 (1842) (invalidating state attempt to bar rendition of fugitive slaves); 
see pp. 174-86. 
20. 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating congressional effort to bar slavery from territo-
ries); see pp. 188-93. 
21. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state statute limiting bakers' hours); see pp. 253-55. 
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating state criminal prohibition against abortion); see pp. 
344-52. 
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in the Fuller Court decisions generally" (p. 247). Roe too "awarded 
total victory to one troop among the combatants" (p. 348). 
Contrast all this with the judicial egalitarian vision that Burt asso-
ciates historically with Madison and Lincoln and urges upon the mod-
em Court. On this view, the Court should not seek "techniques for 
conclusively ending conflict" (p. 136) but instead should facilitate 
"political conversation" (p. 98) or "precipitate a process of collabora-
tion and accommodation" (p. 131) that advances "the mutual empow-
erment of both disputants" (p. 267). The Court should coax 
disputants into "mutually arriv[ing] at a common characterization" 
(p. 98), not act as an "external locus of social control" (p. 97). 
Burt attributes this judicial egalitarian approach originally to 
Madison. Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 argued for interior rather 
than exterior checks on government power through the technique of 
"dividing and then subdividing authority within and among the vari-
ous institutions of govemance."23 Burt reads these texts to imply that 
the Court is " 'co-ordinate' with rather than hierarchically superior to 
the other federal branches in interpreting the Constitution."24 On this 
view, social conflict is not to be siphoned off into courts but rather 
worked out in deliberative political forums where "alienated and po-
tentially hostile rivals come to see one another as reciprocally con-
nected fellow-citizens. "25 
Lincoln likewise had an "aversion to coercion" (p. 90), Burt ar-
gues. Given his "egalitarian conception of political relations" (p. 100), 
he preferred "persuasion" (p. 85) and "mutuality" (p. 90) to external 
force. On this reading, how can one explain Lincoln's command of 
the Union army in the Civil War? This might seem a "considerable 
paradox" (p. 85), Burt concedes. But according to Burt, even force 
can be true to the equality principle so long as it is merely defensively 
designed to restore the status quo ante another's aggression; this is 
"the only way that coercion can be justified within the democratic 
ethos" (p. 85). True to this approach, Lincoln aimed "only at the res-
toration of an equal, mutually consensual relationship" between North 
and South (p. 85). Lincoln's conception of the judicial role, like 
Madison's, was nonsupremacist. The Supreme Court's interpretations 
of the Constitution were fallible - Dred Scott was Exhibit A. If peo-
ple deferred too much to " 'that eminent tribunal,' " Lincoln warned 
in his first inaugural address, they would "'cease[] to be their own 
rulers' " (pp. 98-99). 
23. P. 60 (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison)). 
24. P. 74. Jefferson Powell has challenged the historical accuracy of Burt's reading of 
Madison as an opponent of judicial supremacy. See H. Jefferson Powell, Enslaved to Judicial 
Supremacy?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1205-11 (1993) (book review). 
25. P. 96. In this respect, Burt's reading of Madison echoes the civic republican reading of 
Madison. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1558-64. 
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As paradigmatic examples of the Supreme Court's constitutional 
interpretation in the Madison-Lincoln mode, Burt cites Marbury v. 
Madison26 and Brown v. Board of Education. 27 Burt reads both deci-
sions in a revisionist light; neither, he says, stands for the assertion of 
judicial supremacy conventionally attributed to them. In Marbury, a 
"Madisonian Marshall" (p. 119) fended off the efforts of a Republican 
executive and legislature to "subjugate the judiciary" (p. 121) by de-
clining to side decisively with the Federalist Marbury, thus cleverly 
"avoid[ing] a conclusive resolution of the dispute" (p. 125). He gave 
"room on all sides for recourse to negotiated settlement" (p. 128), 
which led Jefferson gradually to back off from attacking the Federal-
ist-dominated Court (p. 131). 
Likewise, Burt argues, Brown v. Board imposed a "stalemate" on 
the warring parties rather than awarding a conclusive victory to black 
Southerners over white (p. 293). Playing down the judicial suprema-
cist rhetoric of Cooper v. Aaron, 28 Burt argues that Brown is the "cen-
tral example" in our constitutional history of judicial egalitarianism 
toward the political branches (p. 3). Contrary to popular belief, Brown 
was not vindicated when federal troops escorted black students up the 
steps of Little Rock High - the scene depicted, perhaps ironically, in 
the cover photo of the book. Rather, the Court's cautious, interactive 
approach was vindicated nearly twenty years later when Congress 
passed, and the President signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
related legislation (pp. 300-04). In Burt's view, the Court's call for 
"all deliberate speed" in the second Brown v. Board of Education29 was 
not a cowardly capitulation to southern white resistance but rather a 
stroke of judicial egalitarian genius. The Court was self-consciously 
soliciting congressional and executive response that it would have sti-
fled had it intervened more decisively in favor of black civil rights. 
What prescription follows for the modern Court? Return to the 
Madisonian path, says Burt. Roe v. Wade, he suggests, is a textbook 
illustration of the evils of judicial supremacism: by "award[ing] total 
victory" to the prochoice side, the Court cut off "conversation" with 
opponents of abortion, thus licensing prochoice advocates to say to 
prolifers " 'I am entitled to ignore your distress' " (pp. 348-49). Far 
from ending polarized social conflict over the abortion issue, the Court 
merely fanned the flames. What would have been the better, Madis-
onian way? Let a patchwork of differing abortion regimes develop 
among the states and merely enforce pregnant women's right to inter-
state travel (pp. 350-51). 
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see pp. 271-96. 
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
28. See 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that the Supreme Court's "exposition of the Constitu-
tion ... is the supreme law of the land ... ") (emphasis added); see pp. 286-94. 
29. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
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Putting this same point more generally, Burt suggests that the 
Court should intervene in social conflicts not to confer victory on 
either side but rather to "assure that no combatant conclusively 
prevails over the other" (p. 359). How might it go about doing this? 
First, the Court should remove itself from sharp disputes over sub-
stantive questions, remanding them to the political branches via the 
Bickelian passive virtues: ripeness, mootness, standing, political ques-
tion, and clear statement doctrine (pp. 359-62), or whatever else will 
invite what Bickel called a " 'continuing colloquy with the political 
institutions and with society at large.' " 30 Second, if the Court must 
reach the merits, Burt argues, it should use the balancing approach 
characteristic of "so-called 'middle-tier' constitutional scrutiny" (p. 
362) rather than bright-line rules.31 Such balancing "permits and even 
invites a legislative response" (p. 364) by employing "particularistic, 
contextually circumscribed, tentatively offered judicial interventions," 
a contrast with both "grand-style moral philosophizing" and mere 
"surrender to majority will" (pp. 367-68). On this view, decisions 
such as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 32 are steps in 
the right direction. Short of Roe never having issued in the first place, 
the "undue burden" test set forth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 33 
would presumably be Burt's idea of second best. 
III 
The Constitution in Crisis is a serious, thoughtful, and often in-
sightful book. It undertakes a patient and detailed reconstruction of 
our constitutional history. It tries to map out a socially useful role for 
the Supreme Court in the face of our deep divisions and repeated ten-
dencies to engage in "Manichean politics" and the "clash of moral 
absolutes" (p. 355). With such virtues to commend it, why did I find 
Burt's argument so unpersuasive? 
One might be tempted to chalk up my resistance to a constitutional 
Catholic bias, to which I freely confess. But that is not the whole 
story. It seems to me that, even in Protestant terms, Burt's book does 
not make a clear case for so greatly diminishing the role of the Court 
in enforcing constitutional rights. There are two possible crises of 
faith that might drive the Protestant argument. The first is loss of 
faith that constitutional litigation at the Court can be an effective vehi-
30. P. 23 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 240 (1962)). 
31. On this distinction in constitutional law generally, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The 
Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22 (1992). 
32. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (declining to hold the mentally retarded a suspect class, but employ-
ing heightened rationality review to invalidate a city's exclusion of a group home for the mentally 
retarded from a residential neighborhood). 
33. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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cle for bringing about social or political change. The second is loss of 
faith that the Court can articulate the content of constitutional rights. 
Burt seems little driven by the first and equivocal about the second. 
Let us start with the first possibility: loss of faith in the Court. 
Some Court defetishizers come right out and admit that their turn 
from the Court is pragmatically motivated. As Robin West puts it, 
"necessity partly dictates this redirection of liberal energies."34 She 
suggests that, after a quarter-century drought in Democratic nomina· 
tions to the Court and decades of "adversely narrow judicial interpre· 
tation" of the Constitution, 35 anyone in her right mind would turn to 
cultivating social and political change in other forums. Such argu-
ments draw support from recent social science literature suggesting 
that, even in its heyday, the Warren Court was never really much of a 
catalyst of social change. The leading example is Gerald N. Rosen-
berg's 1991 book, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change?, which answered mostly "no" to the question in its subtitle.36 
At moments, Burt sounds a similar pragmatic concern about con-
sequences. In this mode, he suggests that judicial supremacism can be 
politically counterproductive. For example, he adds his voice to the 
now fashionable chorus saying that, but for Roe's "artless interven-
tion" (p. 350), the political process inexorably would have lifted re-
strictions on abortion and we would not have antiabortion terrorists 
blocking abortion clinic doors today (pp. 348-52). Like any 
counterfactual, this can neither be proven nor disproven. But I 
strongly doubt whether politics alone would have outperformed Roe in 
advancing reproductive rights. First, this hypothesis ignores the cul-
ture-shaping effect of constitutional adjudication; once something has 
been held a right, it has clout in the political process that it would not 
have if it were called, say, a special interest.37 Second, it is hardly 
clear that political talk would have done any more than judicial fiat to 
unsettle the deep convictions of those who condemn abortion as mur-
der. Burt favors the optimistic view that American social relations are 
"amenable to peaceful compromise" (p. 259), but our recent national 
experience - consider not only abortion but also the debate over gay 
service members in the military - furnishes plenty of justification for 
Hobbesian pessimism. By underestimating the intractability of deeply 
held convictions, Burt undervalues the pragmatic attractiveness of su-
premacist courts. 
Far more important to Burt than the pragmatic argument, how-
34. West, supra note 16, at 93. 
35. Id. 
36. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991). For a review of The Hollow Hope, see Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts Matter?, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 1216 (1992) (book review). 
37. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 193.94 (1990) 
(arguing that Roe begat the prochoice political movement, not the other way around). 
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ever, is his apparent philosophical skepticism toward constitutional 
rights. Lack of foundations troubles him more than loss of Court 
seats. This is most evident from the "equality principle" he makes the 
linchpin of the book. 
This principle arises out of what Burt calls "an internal contradic-
tion in democratic theory between majority rule and equal self-deter-
mination" (p. 29). In a democracy of equals, the only legitimate 
decisions are those produced by unanimity, or "mutual consent" (p. 
101). "[C]oercion in any form is the enemy of democratic life" (p. 
375). Burt defines "coercion" exceptionally broadly: "coercion can 
occur on the battlefield, in a legislature, or in a courtroom," whether 
by "force of arms," "by majority vote or by judicial override on behalf 
of the previously defeated minority" (p. 29). In all three settings, the 
losing party has been "coerc[ed]," "subjugat[ed]," or "enslav[ed]" (pp. 
28-29, 235, 282-83). 
This is a very idiosyncratic definition of coercion. It is at odds 
with any conventional understanding of constitutionalism. In labeling 
majority rule and judicial review "coercion," Burt flies in the face of 
three centuries of social contract theory maintaining that ex ante 
precommitment to constitutional procedures precludes ex post sour 
grapes about particular outcomes. 
If not from the Constitution, where does Burt's equality principle 
come from? Apparently from an elementary psychological model to 
which Burt would reduce all social conflict: "[I]magine you, me and a 
third person in the same room. Two of us decide that you should give 
your life to serve us"; if "we" win, then "you" will feel "enslave[d]" 
(pp. 27-28). Burt implies that if "you" convinced a court to enjoin 
"us," then "we" too would feel "enslaved." "No matter who wins, the 
principle of self-rule is defeated" (p. 29). 
By reducing all constitutional antagonists to repeat players in this 
elementary drama, Burt forecloses the possibility of normative judg-
ment about which claims to subjugation are better. To Burt, all play-
ers are equal candidates for the experience of subjugation, because that 
experience is in the eye of the beholder. Thus, slavery "subjugat[ed]" 
slaves, but the Civil War and Reconstruction likewise "subjugat[ed]" 
former slaveholders (p. 77). Jim Crow laws "subordinated" black 
Southerners, but overturning Jim Crow would "subordinate[]" white 
Southerners (p. 19). Blacks and whites, the Court and the President, 
the national government and the states, Federalists and Republicans, 
advocates for and against reproductive choice - each can "subjugate" 
the other at any time. 
One need not be a moral realist to think that constitutional antago-
nists are not so morally fungible. Some feelings of unequal treatment 
may be better legitimated against some backdrop cultural understand-
ing of subjugation than others. Just because losers feel subordinated 
1130 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1121 
does not mean that they are right. Bakke38 might feel just as much the 
victim of race discrimination as Plessy, 39 but a coherent account of 
equal protection may be given to explain why Plessy's feelings are jus· 
tified and Bakke's are not. By universalizing the concept of subjuga· 
tion, Burt treats powerful and pariah as equivalent. 
Burt's value skepticism, in any event, founders on an internal con· 
sideration. Although he suggests that constitutional judgment rests 
"wholly on the subjective evaluations of the social disputants them· 
selves" (p. 97), such subjectivism is belied by the central moral com· 
mand of the book: "thou shalt not subjugate." Burt cannot 
simultaneously deny all objective values and affirm this one as the ulti· 
mate trump. 
If Burt is not, after all, a value skeptic, perhaps be is simply a judge 
skeptic - arguing not that there are no values but only that the Court 
is institutionally inferior to the contending parties at articulating 
them.40 On this view, the Court plays as psychotherapist - it can 
facilitate agreement, but the contending parties really have to want to 
change. This is a far thinner role for the Court than the already thin 
role assigned it by Burt's acknowledged intellectual progenitor, Alex· 
ander Bickel.41 Like Bickel, Burt sees the Court as a participant in an 
ongoing and interactive dialogue with other political institutions and 
society at large. But if Burt is skeptical about the Court's competence 
to articulate constitutional rights, it is unclear why it should have even 
this thin role. Bickel at least thought that the Court, given its political 
insulation and its professional culture, had a real comparative advan· 
tage at talking. In Burt's vision, it is no longer clear why, when the 
Court talks, anyone should listen to it more than to anyone else. 
38. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
39. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
40. Jefferson Powell shrewdly links this aspect of Burt's argument to the proceduralist ethics 
of Richard Rorty. See Powell, supra note 24, at 1215-17. 
41. See pp. 20-33. 
